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Methods of quantum mechanics promise information-theoretic security for various protocols in 
cryptography. However, impossibility of some cryptographic applications such as standard bit 
commitment, oblivious transfer, multiparty secure computations and ideal coin tossing in 
quantum regime leaves an obvious question on the completeness of quantum cryptography. 
Instead of using wide range of rules and techniques for a variety of cryptographic applications, 
we demonstrate here a unified structure for quantum cryptography based on quantum non-local 
correlations. The unified framework achieves same goals in information-theoretic way as 
classical cryptography does with computational hardness. To cover the broad range of 
cryptographic applications, we show that the framework (i) assures secrecy by providing 
encryption completely unintelligible to eavesdroppers, (ii) guarantees that input from distant 
parties is concealed unless they are willing to reveal, (iii) assures binding, (iv) allows splitting 
information between several parties securely and more generally, (v) evades both quantum and 
classical attacks from internal as well as external eavesdropping.  
    
Introduction 
Quantum information theory1 encodes information over probabilistic microscopic systems, called 
qubits, which are represented by unit vectors in Hilbert space and are processed through unitary 
operators. As a result, rules of quantum mechanics such as interference, uncertainty principle, 
quantum no-cloning2, and EPR type correlations3-5 provide novel features in information 
processing such as quantum teleportation6, quantum computation7,8, quantum communication9,10, 
and quantum cryptography11-13.  
Among these advancements in information processing, quantum cryptography is the most 
promising and practically existed application of quantum mechanics. The most celebrated 
application of quantum cryptography, namely QKD11,12, is the outcome of quantum uncertainty 
principle and quantum non-local correlations. QKD is the very basic ingredient for 
communication between distant parties with information theoretic security14. Besides 
cryptography based on QKD11,12,14, a number of other information-theoretic quantum 
cryptographic applications such as optimal quantum encryption techniques15, quantum secret 
sharing16 (QSS), quantum finger printing17, quantum digital signatures18,19 (QDS), and 
asymmetric quantum cryptography in general have also been proposed.  
However, a large class of cryptographic applications such as standard bit commitment 
(BC), oblivious transfer (OT, proposed by Rabin), two-sided two-party secure computation 
(TPSC), and asynchronous ideal coin tossing (CT) are still considered to be impossible in 
quantum cryptography20-24. Such no-go theorems for important tasks in quantum regime with 
information theoretic security leave an obvious question on the completeness of quantum 
cryptography.  
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Here we address the following very interesting questions: Instead of using wide range of 
techniques in quantum cryptography, is it possible to develop a unified quantum framework that 
would implement all tasks with information-theoretic security? A related question would be to 
ask: can such a general framework achieve same goals in information-theoretic way as classical 
cryptography does with computational hardness? If yes, then the framework needs to incorporate 
following security requirements: (i) it must provide perfect encryption completely unintelligible 
to eavesdroppers (secrecy). (ii) Input from distant parties must be concealed (BC, OT, MPSC, 
CT). (iii) It must assure binding (BC, QDS, MPSC, and CT). (iv) It must split information 
between several parties securely (QSS and QDS). More importantly, (v) it must evade both 
quantum and classical attacks from internal as well as external eavesdropping. 
We demonstrate here that answers to the above questions are positive and propose a 
unified quantum framework, expressible in a single mathematical equation. The proposed 
framework is based on quantum non-local correlations in the form of teleportation6 and 
entanglement swapping6,25 and splits information between several parties where each of these 
parties extracts piece of secret that is non-locally correlated with information other parties have. 
We show that these non-locally correlated pieces of information can be used for implementing 
all pioneering cryptographic tasks such as standard bit commitment with arbitrarily long 
commitment time26, quantum secret sharing27, quantum digital signature scheme28, oblivious 
transfer, two sided two-party secure computation, multiparty-party secure computation, and 
hence ideal coin tossing.  
In a related work, we showed that theory of relativity adds more powers and extends 
scope of this unified framework. For example, relativistic version of proposed framework  allows 
secure positioning29-31, multiparty BC where both parties commit and reveal simultaneously32,33, 
QSDC purely based on positioning, secure and authenticated communication based on bilateral 
secure positioning, information-theoretic security for two-sided cryptographic applications34 
(TPSC, CT), and relativistic OT where both data and position remains oblivious34.   
 
Entanglement 
One of the most important resources of quantum information is entanglement. Detailed 
discussion about entanglement, its relation with foundations of quantum mechanics, and 
applications in quantum cryptography can be found in a recent review35. Let’s denote Bell states 
as ),( 0 iΨΨ=Ψµ
 
with µ
 
running over 0,1,2,3 while i=1,2,3. To keep the notations simple, we 
are not using Dirac’s bta-ket notations for Bell states here. However, we keep using Dirac’s 
notation for single qubit states.  
                                                            2
11000 +
=Ψ
                                                       (1.1) 
                                                            2
10011 +
=Ψ
                                                        (1.2) 
                                                            2
11002 −
=Ψ
                                                        (1.3) 
                                                            2
10013 −
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                                                        (1.4) 
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Each of these four Bell states is related to other three by the unilateral application of one of the 
three Pauli matrices iσ . For example, ii Ψ=Ψ⊗ 00 σσ or we can write ii Ψ=ΨΩ 0  where 
),( 0 iΩΩ=Ωρ
 
are 22 22 ×  unitary matrices with 4)( 0 =ΩTr  and 0)( =ΩiTr  and can be written in 
outer product form
 
of 22×
 
Pauli matrices ),( 0 iσσσρ =
 
as ρρ σσ ⊗=Ω 0 . 
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If we define inner product of ρΩ
 
and ρ ′Ω
 
as  )( TTr ρρ ′ΩΩ
 
, then the set ),( 0 iΩΩ=Ωρ  forms 
orthonormal basis for four dimensional inner product space.  
                                                                     
ρρρρ δ ′′ =ΩΩ 4)( TTr                                                            (2) 
Or 
                                                                         
IT 4
3
0
=ΩΩ∑
=ρ
ρρ                                                             (3) 
Moreover, one-to-one mapping of sets ),( 0 iΩΩ=Ωρ
 
and ),( 0 iΨΨ=Ψµ
 
leads to completely 
mixed outcome, that is, 
                                          
0Ψ=ΨΩ µρ                                                              (4) 
for µρ = . For example, 000 Ψ=ΨΩ  , 
01
1 Ψ=ΨΩ  and so on. 
 
 
Quantum cryptography 
We demonstrate here a unified framework for quantum cryptography, expressible in a single 
mathematical equation, and show that it describes all pioneering cryptographic tasks such as 
standard bit commitment with arbitrarily long commitment time, quantum secret sharing, 
quantum digital signature scheme, oblivious transfer, deterministic multiparty-party secure 
computations and hence coin tossing. The rest of the cryptographic tasks can be built on any one 
of these fundamental procedures.  
For generality, let’s suppose there are three stations A, B and C who share a quantum 
system νµψ Ψ⊗Ψ⊗=iH . Here ψ
 
is a single qubit state kept at station A while µΨ
 
and νΨ
 
are maximally entangled Bell states shared between stations A and C and B and C respectively. 
By using Bell basis (1), initially shared quantum system iH
 
can be written as  
                                             
( ) ( ) ( )cba νρτµρτνµ ψσψ ΨΩ⊗⊗ΨΩΩ=Ψ⊗Ψ⊗ 41                           (5) 
where µρτµ ΨΩΩ=Ψ′′ , ψσψ τ=′ , and νρν ΨΩ=Ψ′ . Above equation (5) is the set of 16 
equations where Einstein summation rule is applied on index ρ
 
andτ .  
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 Now if station C performs Bell state measurement (BSM)36 on νΨ′ , he gets two classical 
bits }11,10,01,00{∈′cc while distant and uncorrelated stations A and B gets entangled through one 
of the EPR channel },{ 0 iΨΨ∈Ψ′µ . Now station A can teleport quantum state ψ
 
to station B 
over EPR channel µΨ′  by performing BSM on µΨ′′ . As a result, A gets classical 2-bits 
}11,10,01,00{∈′aa
 
while entangled half at station B becomes ψσψ τ=′ .  
For each value of C’s BSM result cc ′ , there comes a unique Bell state µΨ′
 
swapped 
between A and B and hence unique teleportation encoding of quantum state ψ  corresponding 
to BSM result aa ′
 
of A. In other words, the teleportation encoding τσ
 
is non-locally correlated 
with classical 2-bit strings aa ′ and cc ′ as well as initially shared EPR system νµ Ψ⊗Ψ . Hence, the 
proposed framework allows distributing non-locally correlated information at all three stations 
A, B, and C. 
For generality, we formulated the task between three labeled stations A, B and C. For any 
specific cryptographic application, these stations can be assigned to different parties as follows: 
For quantum BC, OT, TPSC, and CT, station A is kept by committer/client Alice while stations 
B and C are controlled by receiver/server Bob. For QSS and QDSS, and TPSC, stations A, B, 
and C are controlled by three different parties namely Alice, Bob and Charlie where Alice is the 
sender while Bob and Charlie are receivers.  
For k-bit string (massage/commitment/input) k⊗∈ }1,0{ψ , the proposed formulism can 
be iterated k times where each iteration sends/commits 1-bit from station A to B and C or 
provide deterministic 1-bit outcome of two-sided computations );,,( ψσσσ cbaf
 
calculated over 
input state ψ . Here Pauli transformation iσ is input from station i. Let’s suppose all stations 
agree on the following codes:  
Code-I: Pauli transformations 210 ,, σσσ or 3σ
 
corresponds to classical 2-bit strings 10,01,00
 
or 
11  respectively. That is, by applying one of the Pauli operators },,,{ 3210 σσσσσ ∈ms to the shared 
quantum system νµψ Ψ⊗Ψ⊗  means an input of 2-bit string }11,10,01,00{∈ms
 
to the system.  
Code-II: The mapping },{}10,00{ 20 σσ→∈ms  represents signature bit 0=s while message bit
}1,0{∈m . Similarly, the mapping },{}11,01{ 31 σσ→∈ms  represents signature bit 1=s while 
message bit }1,0{∈m .  
In other words, for each signature bit, there are two arbitrary message bits corresponding 
to Pauli operator sxmzms σσσ = . Hence, if the protocol is iterated k time, the input kms⊗σ  generates k-
bit signature, kn 2=
 
possible k-bit messages, and k-bit deterministic outcome of some function 
);,,( ψσσσ cbaf
 
calculated over input state k⊗∈ }1,0{ψ . 
 
Information-theoretic security  
Unconditionally secure encrypting of n qubit state ψ , quantum one-time pad15, is possible if 
encryption algorithm uses at least 2n random classical bits and the set },{ ρρ Up  with 
np 22/1=ρ  
and }{ ρU  is the set of n22  unitary nn 22 ×  matrices that form an orthonormal basis. The quantum 
one-time pad is information-theoretically secure if following condition holds: 
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Our task here is not the unconditional secrecy of ψ
 
from external eavesdropping only. This can 
be achieved from teleportation straightforward. Considering the generality of proposed 
framework, we would demand (i) perfect encryption completely unintelligible to external 
eavesdroppers, (ii) concealing from legitimate users, (iii) binding from sender, (iv) information 
splitting between several parties securely, and (v) finally information theoretic security from 
both classical and Mayers and Lo-Chau (MLC) quantum attacks20-24. 
To see whether proposed framework (5) satisfies all these security requirements or not, 
let’s divide equation (5) into two parts; first entanglement swapping by station C and then 
teleportation by station A over swapped EPR channel between A and B as follows: 
          
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )cbaTelecabES νρτµρτνρµρνµ ψσψψ ΨΩ⊗⊗ΨΩΩ→ΨΩ⊗ΨΩ⊗→Ψ⊗Ψ⊗ 4121        (8) 
As standard for quantum cryptography, we assume that all the classical channels between Alice, 
Bob, and Charlie can be passively monitored but cannot be actively tempered by eavesdroppers. 
However, all the quantum channels can be actively disturbed. 
Entanglement swapping: Station C shares Bell states µΨ  and νΨ
 
with stations A and B 
respectively while stations A and B are uncorrelated initially. Procedure of entanglement 
swapping can be written in Bell basis as  
                                                         
( ) ( )cab νρµρνµ ΨΩ⊗ΨΩ=Ψ⊗Ψ 21                                            (9) 
Here Einstein summation rule is applied on index ρ . That is, initially shared quantum system 
νµ Ψ⊗Ψ
 
is local unitary equivalent to νµ Ψ′⊗Ψ′
 
where µρµ ΨΩ=Ψ′
 
is Bell state possessed by 
distant stations A and B while Bell state νρν ΨΩ=Ψ′
 
is kept at station C. By applying local Bell 
operator on νΨ′ , C gets two classical bits cc ′ while distant and uncorrelated stations A and B 
gets entangled through one of the EPR channel },{ 0 iΨΨ∈Ψ′µ . Regardless of the initially shared 
Bell states µΨ  and νΨ , outcome of Bell operator on state νΨ′
 
at station C can be one of the four 
possible 2-bit string }11,10,01,00{∈′cc  each with probability 4/1=ρp .  
                                                                       
Ip T =ΩΩ∑
=
3
0ρ
ρρρ                                                            (10) 
Hence, the initially shared quantum system νµ Ψ⊗Ψ carries no information about Bell state µΨ′
 swapped between distance stations A and B unless A and B do not communicate with each other 
or with C. 
                                                          
( )( ) Ip TT
4
13
0
=ΩΨ′Ψ′Ω∑
=ρ
ρ
µµ
ρρ
                                                     
 (11) 
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Teleportation: Now suppose station A keeps single qubit state ψ
 
and shares a Bell state 
µ
ρ
µ ΨΩ=Ψ′
 with a distant station B. Initially shared quantum system µψ Ψ′⊗
 
 can be 
rewritten in Bell basis as 
                                                           
ψσψ τµτµ ⊗Ψ′Ω=Ψ′⊗ 2
1
                                                    
 (12) 
Here Einstein summation rule is applied on indexτ . That is, initially shared quantum system 
µψ Ψ′⊗
 
is local unitary equivalent to ψµ ′⊗Ψ′′
 
where µρτµτµ ΨΩΩ=Ψ′Ω=Ψ′′
 
is the Bell 
state on site of A while ψσψ τ=′
 
is quantum state on site of B. By applying local Bell 
operator on state µτµ Ψ′Ω=Ψ′′ , A can teleport quantum state ψ  to B. Regardless of the initially 
shared quantum system µψ Ψ′⊗ , outcome of Bell operator on state µΨ ′′
 
at station A can be one 
of the four possible 2-bit string }11,10,01,00{∈′aa
 
each with probability 4/1=ρp .  
                                                                        
Ip T =ΩΩ∑
=
3
0τ
τττ                                                          (13) 
Hence, the shared quantum system or qubit state ψ ′
 
at station B carries no information about 
the quantum state ψ  unless A announces her BSM result and B and C collaborate. 
                                                                   
Ip T
2
13
0
=∑
=τ
τττ σψψσ                                                     (14) 
Here swapped EPR channel µΨ′  between A and B is known only to station C and remains 
unknown to both stations A and B unless C communicates with A or B. However, teleportation 
encoding τσ
 
remains unknown to all three stations A, B and C. Now if station A publically 
announces her BSM result aa ′ , then teleportation encoding τσ
 
is known only to C but still 
remains unknown to both A and B. Hence encrypted state ψσψ τ=′
 
at station B remains 
arbitrary to A while message state ψ
 
remains unknown to B even though he knows BSM result 
of A. However, if B and C collaborate, they can extract ψ
 
from ψ ′  while A and C can know 
cipher state ψ ′
 
by mutual cooperation.  
In short, if any station announces his/her share, other two stations can verify or aborts on 
the basis of their non-locally correlated information. The proposed framework fulfills all the 
security requirements (i)-(v) as follows: 
Secrecy from external eavesdropping: The message state ψ
 
is perfectly encrypted and fulfils 
security requirements of quantum one time pad (6,7). Hence any external eavesdropper E cannot 
excess state ψ . 
Hiding from internal users: The message state ψ
 
remains hidden from both B and C unless A 
reveals her BSM result aa ′ . Even after getting aa ′ , station B remains ignorant about teleportation 
encoding τσ  and hence message state ψ .  
Binding: Since station A does not know the ciphertext ψστ
 
stored at station B, he cannot 
synchronize her message ψ
 
and BSM result aa ′
 
with unknown ciphertext ψστ . Hence 
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proposed framework provides information-theoretic security against repudiation by station A. 
Moreover, even if B knows the message when A reveals to him (QDSS), he cannot forge the 
message before sending to station C. In general, proposed framework provides binding to all 
stations where anyone applies Pauli transformation; he/she cannot repudiate or forge later.  
Information splitting: Can B or C extract ψ
 
from ψστ
 
alone unless station A reveals? No. 
Ciphertext ψστ
 
is the outcome of two-fold encryption on message state ψ : the unitary 
encryption operator τσ is non-locally correlated with BSM results aa ′ and cc ′ of stations A and C 
respectively. So only having ciphertext ψστ
 
or BSM result cc ′
 
is not sufficient for finding 
message ψ . However, if station A announces her BSM result aa ′ , B and C can collaborate and 
find message ψ . 
MLC attacks: Can A, B or C exploit MLC attacks? That is, can any station delay his/her input 
and try to influence measurement outcome
 
by getting information about other stations’ input? 
No. Repetitive measurements and stored pieces of non-locally correlated classical information at 
various stations do not allow MLC attacks. The most obvious possibilities of exploiting MLC 
attacks can come from station C. If he does not perform BSM on νΨ′ , message state ψ
 
will be 
teleported to him. To overcome this cheating strategy from C, station A can send her BSM result 
aa ′ to station B only. Hence without aa ′ , C cannot extract ψ
 
from cipher state ψσ τ′ .   
 
Discussion: 
The proposed unified framework can be modified in a number of ways according to available 
quantum technologies: (i) instead of having pre-shared entanglement, each station can prepare 
and send entnagled qubit to the other station. This allows the host station to keep exact identity 
of epr pair secret and then built quantum cryptography with following code:   The Bell states 
3210
,,, ΨΨΨΨ  represent classical 2-bit string 11,10,01,00
 
respectively. That is, by preparing and 
sharing one of the Bell states },,,{ 3210 ΨΨΨΨ∈Ψ  means party is sending/committing 
corresponding 2-bit string }11,10,01,00{∈ms . 
 The same framework can be utilized for Asymmetric quantum cryptography by sharing a 
global public key },...3,2,1:),2/{(
,2/ kiK ii == ϕpiϕpi
 
and utilizing the quantum-classical 
correspondence between classical message kψψψψ .....21=
 
where }1,0{∈iψ
 
and quantum state 
kψψψψ .....21= . It provides an additional layer of security through completely mixed effects 
of Pauli operators on quantum state ψϕpi ,2/K
 
and classical counterpartψ . Moreover, it reduces 
the communication complexity; in most case, same outcomes can be achieved with less 
communication rounds.   
Finally, theory of relativity adds more powers and extends scope of this unified 
framework. For example, relativistic version of proposed framework  allows secure positioning, 
multiparty generalization of BC where both parties commit and reveal simultaneously, secure 
and authenticated direct communication based on bilateral secure positioning, information-
theoretic security for two-sided cryptographic applications, and relativistic oblivious transfer  
where both data and position remains oblivious.   
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Supplementary Material 
 
Applications in Cryptography 
 
The proposed unified framework fulfills security requirements (i)-(v) and hence covers broad 
range of cryptographic primitives defined below: 
Bit commitment: A bit commitment is a task between two mistrustful parties, a committer and a 
receiver. In general, committer commits to a specific bit by giving some information to the 
receiver and then unveils his/her commitment at some later time. Standard bit commitment is 
said to be information-theoretically secure if it fulfils following three security requirements: (i) 
Hiding: receiver should not be able to extract the committed bit value during the scheme. (ii) 
Binding: when committer reveals, it must be possible for receiver to know the genuine bit value 
with absolute guarantee while committer should not be able to reveal a bit different from the 
committed one. (iii) Indefinite commitment time: the scheme should sustain information-
theoretic security for arbitrarily long time after commitment made by committer. 
Oblivious transfer: OT was originally defined by Rabin where sender Bob sends a 1-bit 
message to the receiver Alice who can only receive the message with probability no more than 
half.  The security of the protocol relies on the fact that Alice can find out whether or not he got 
the 1-bit message from Bob after the completion of protocol but Bob remains oblivious about it. 
In a related notion, 1-out-of-2 OT, Bob sends two 1-bit messages to Alice who can only receive 
one of them and remains ignorant about the other while Bob remains entirely oblivious to which 
of the two messages Alice received1,2. It was shown later by Crépeau that both of these notions 
of OT are equivalent3. 
Asynchronous Ideal coin tossing: Coin tossing4 is another fundamental primitive function in 
communication that allows distant mistrustful parties Alice and Bob to agree on a random data. 
Coin tossing is said to be ideal if it follows: (i). It results in three possible outcomes f : 00 =f , 
11 =f  or f = invalid. (ii). Outcome 0f  and 1f  occurs with equal probability 2/110 == ff PP and 
both parties have equal cheating probabilities, ba PP = , which means that the coin tossing is fair. 
(iii). If both parties are honest, the outcome f = invalid never occurs; 0=
=invalidfP . (iv). If any 
one of the parties is dishonest, the outcome invalid occurs with probability 1=
=invalidfP . 
Two sided Two-party secure computations: Two-sided TPSC enables two distant parties Alice 
and Bob to compute a function f (a,b) where a and b are inputs from Alice and Bob 
respectively5,6. The protocol is said to be secure if it fulfils following security requirements: (i) 
both Alice and Bob learn output of f (a,b) deterministically. (ii) Alice learns nothing about Bob’s 
input b except what logically comes from a and f (a,b). (iii) Bob learns nothing about Alice’s 
input a except what logically comes from b and f (a,b). 
Quantum secret sharing: Secret sharing7,8 is a cryptographic procedure where a secret (or 
decryption function of secret) is divided among multiple parties such that each party gets a part 
of secret (or decryption function of secret) but cannot extract the secret on its own. However, the 
secret can only be reconstructed (extracted) when all the parties collaborate together and share 
their part. Such a secret sharing scheme is called (n, n) threshold scheme. In general, the original 
secret can be reconstructed if and only if at least k ≤ n parties collaborate called a (k, n) secret 
sharing threshold scheme. 
Quantum digital signature: A standard digital signature scheme9,11 must fulfill at least 
following three security requirements: (a) the signature must be a pattern depending upon the 
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message to be signed. (b) The signature must be built on some information unique to the 
signatory. (c)  The scheme must allow all the recipients to store a copy of signature for 
verification at later stage. 
 All these pioneering cryptographic primitives have also been discussed in quantum 
cryptography where QSS12-14 promises information splitting with information-theoretic security. 
However, standard BC15-17, OT18, asynchronous ideal CT17, and two-sided TPSC18,19 in general 
are considered to be impossible even in quantum regime. Methods of quantum mechanics, 
quantum one-way functions20,21, guarantee information-theoretic security for quantum digital 
signature21,22, but on the cost of quantum memory.  
 We demonstrate all these primitives with information-theoretic security and practically 
feasibility with current quantum technology; without requiring quantum memory or definite EPR 
pairs which have very low probability of generation.  In all the cryptographic application outlines 
below, the first three steps of unified framework (5) will be common: 
1. Station C performs BSM on νΨ′  and stores classical result cc ′ . 
2. Station A teleports state ψ
 
to B by performing BSM on µΨ′′ . As a result, station A gets 
classical 2-bit string aa ′ while entangled half at station B becomes ψσψ τ=′ . 
3. Station B measures ψ ′
 
and stores classical result }1,0{∈′ψ . 
 
Two-party cryptography 
Suppose stations A is kept by committer Alice while those of B and C are controlled by receiver 
Bob. 
Bit commitment: For devising quantum bit commitment scheme, we assume that Bell state µΨ  
 
is publically known, Bell state νΨ is the secret of Bob while ψ
 
where }1,0{∈ψ
 
is the secret bit 
committed by Alice.  
4. Alice also sends state ψσσψ axaz ′=′′
 
to Bob.  
5. Bob measures ψ ′′  and stores }1,0{∈′′ψ .  
6. Alice reveals her commitment }1,0{∈ψ
 
to Bob.  
Verification: Bob finds the 2-bit string aa ′ from ψσσψ axaz ′=′′ . He verifies whether the 
commitment is genuine or not as follows: He finds τσ
 
from non-locally correlated classical 
information aa ′  and cc ′ . Bob authenticates the commitment genuine if ψσψ τ=′
 
otherwise 
detects cheating. This simple bit commitment scheme fulfills all three security requirements of 
standard bit commitment: (i) hiding, (ii) binding, and (iii) indefinite commitment time. 
Asynchronous Ideal coin tossing: Suppose initially shared system 00 Ψ⊗Ψ=Ψ⊗Ψ νµ  is 
publically known. For an asynchronous ideal coin tossing, Alice and Bob want to compute the 
function );,( ψσσ τcf
 
where }1,0{∈ψ  is the secret input by Alice and cxczc ′= σσσ  is 
transformation applied by Bob on state ψσψ τ=′ .  
4. Bob applies transformation cxczc ′= σσσ
 
on ψσψ τ=′
 
and announces the outcome of coin 
tossing ψσσψσσ ττ ccf =);,( . 
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Verification: Alice applies unitary transformations axaza ′= σσσ
 
on function f  and verifies the 
outcome valid if ψσ =fa
 
otherwise aborts. Since Bob do not know ψ
 
and aa ′ , hence, he 
cannot simulate alterations in cc ′  with ψσψ τ=′
 
and hence outcome of his choice.  
It fulfills the security requirements of an asynchronous ideal quantum coin tossing with 
zero bias: (i) deterministic outcome occurs with equal probability of 0=f
 
or 1=f ; 
2/110 == == ff PP . (ii) Cheating probabilities for Alice and Bob are zero; 0== ba PP . (iii) 
Probability 
 
0=
=invalidfP  if both parties are honest and 1==invalidfP if any one of the parties tries 
cheating.  
 The basic idea behind setting 00 Ψ⊗Ψ=Ψ⊗Ψ νµ  and using step 4 is equation (4); 
0Ψ=ΨΩ µρ
 
if µρ = . In other words, whatever the BSM result Alice and Bob get at stations A 
and C, following identity holds 
                                                             
Icx
c
z
a
x
a
z =
′′ τσσσσσ                                                             (1) 
Hence, without knowing each other’s BSM results, both Alice and Bob get deterministic 
outcome of coin tossing. This simple coin tossing scheme is both ideal and asynchronous since 
no classical communication is required at all and both parties apply unitary transformations 
asynchronously.  
Oblivious transfer: Suppose initially shared system 00 Ψ⊗Ψ=Ψ⊗Ψ νµ  is publically known. 
For oblivious transfer from Bob to Alice, Alice and Bob want to compute the function 
);,( ψσσ τcf
 
where }1,0{∈ψ  is the secret input by Alice and cxczc ′= σσσ  is transformation 
applied by Bob on state ψσψ τ=′ .  
4. Bob applies transformation cxczc ′= σσσ
 
on ψσψ τ=′
 
and sends the outcome of function 
ψσσψσσ ττ ccf =);,(  to Alice.  
Verification: Alice applies unitary transformations axaza ′= σσσ
 
on function f  and verifies the 
outcome valid if ψσ =fa
 
otherwise challenge the process. Both the security requirement of OT 
are satisfied: After the completion of protocol, (i) Bob do not know the Alice bitinput }1,0{∈ψ  
and (ii) Alice do not know the Bob’s messages }1,0{∈c corresponding to his signature c′ . 
Two sided Two-party secure computations: Suppose Station A is kept by Alice while B and C 
are controlled by Bob respectively who wants to compute the function );,,( ψσσσ τbaf
 
where 
ψ
 
( 0=ψ
 
or 1=ψ ) is publically known and Pauli transformations aσ
 
and bσ on quantum 
system ψ
 
are inputs from Alice and Bob respectively. To allow both parties giving their inputs, 
we rewrite steps 2 and 3 and then proceed as follows: 
2. Alice applies Pauli transformation },{ 2121 1 axazaxaza σσσσσ ⊕∈  on ψ , teleports the state ψσ a  
to Bob over EPR channel µΨ′ . Simultaneously she sends ψσσσψ aaxaz ′=′′  to Bob where 
a
x
a
za
′
=′ σσσ
 is depending on her BSM result aa ′
13 
 
3. Bob measures his entangled half ψσσψ τ a=′ and state ψσσσψ aaxaz ′=′′  and stores 
classical results. He applies Pauli transformation },{ 2121 1 bxbzbxbzb σσσσσ ⊕∈
 
corresponding to his 
input and cxczc
′
=′ σσσ on ψ ′
 
and sends ψσσσσψ τ abc′=′′′
 
to Alice. 
4. Alice applies axaza
′
=′ σσσ
 
on ψ ′′′  and announces both his BSM result aa ′  and the outcome of 
two-sided computation  
                                                
ψσσσσσψσσ τ abcabaf ′′=);,(                                              (2) 
It fulfills the security requirements of secure and deterministic two-sided TPSC: (i) Alice can 
find Bob’s transformation 21bbb →σ
 
but his input }1,0{1 ∈b  remains totally random to her. (ii) 
Similarly, Bob can find Alice’s transformation 21aaa →σ
 
but her input }1,0{1 ∈a remains totally 
random to him. Finally, (iii) both Alice and Bob gets same unbiased outcome of function 
);,( ψσσ baf
 
deterministically.  
 
Multi-party cryptography 
Suppose stations A, B, and C are controlled by three independent parties namely Alice, Bob, and 
Charlie respectively. 
Quantum secret sharing: The proposed framework results in (2, 2) secure quantum secret 
sharing that allows sender Alice to encrypt her secret ψ , which can be either classical }1,0{∈ψ  
or purely quantum mechanical 10 βαψ += , such that only a group of receivers (Bob and 
Charlie) can decrypt her secret from ψστ . 
If Alice follows procedure (5), ψστ  in possession of receiver Bob gives perfect 
encryption of her secret ψ  where decryption function τσ  is non-locally correlated with both 
BSM results cc ′  and aa ′
 
of receiver Charlie and sender Alice respectively. As a result, secret 
ψ
 
can be decoded from ψστ
 
if and only if Alice reveals aa ′ while Bob and Charlie 
collaborate with each other.  
While considering the possibilities of MLC quantum attacks by Charlie, sender Alice 
needs to assure authentication from receiver’s ends. Before revealing her BSM result, she would 
require some sort of authentication tokens from both Bob and Charlie and assurance that state 
ψ
 
has been teleported to Bob and not Charlie. In other case, Charlie can have both shares and 
hence can find secret alone.  
Quantum digital signature: For devising quantum digital signature scheme based on quantum 
secret sharing, we assume that publically known Bell states µΨ
 
and νΨ
 
are pre-shared while 
ψ
 
( }1,0{∈ψ
 
) is the message to be signed by Alice. Here, non-locally correlated states 
ψσψ τ=′
 
and ψσψ a′=′′
 
where axaza
′
=′ σσσ , are considered to be signatures of Alice here.  
4. Alice sends state ψσσψ axaz ′=′′
 
to Charlie.  
5. Charlie measures ψ ′′
 
in {0,1} basis and stores outcome.  
6. Bob and Charlie share their secrets ψ ′
 
and cc ′
 
with each other, secretly from Alice. 
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Verification: Alice sends her message ψ
 
and BSM result aa ′
 
to Bob. By using aa ′  and cc ′ , 
Bob verifies whether ψ
 
and ψ ′  are consistent with τσ or not. Bob authenticates the message 
if ψσψ τ=′
 
otherwise detects repudiation. If Bob validates that message and signature are 
agreed, he forwards the message ψ
 
to Charlie.  
 Now Charlie verifies whether forgery or repudiation has occurred or not as follows: He 
finds aa ′
 
from ψσσψ axaz ′=′′  and verifies whether ψσψ τ=′  is consistent with cc ′ or not. If 
teleportation encoding τσ
 
is consistent with non-locally correlated shares aa ′  and cc ′ , he 
accepts the message genuine.   
 For k-bit message kψψψψ .....21= , Bob and Charlie can exchange some parts of their 
secrets instated of exchanging whole shares. For example, Bob divides his secret 
kψψψψ ′′′=′ .....21
 
into two parts; bψ ′
 
and 
c
ψ ′ and sends 
c
ψ ′
 
to Charlie. Similarly, Charlie 
divides his secret },....2,1;{ kiccc ii =′=  into bc and cc and sends bc  to Bob. Here order of sequence 
b
 
and c  are agreed between Bob and Charlie but unknown to Alice. This prevents Alice to 
create conflict between Bob and Charlie. 
Multi-party secure computations: Suppose system νµψ Ψ⊗Ψ⊗=iH is publically known 
while Alice, Bob, and Charlie want to compute the function );,,( ψσσσ cbaf . Here aσ , bσ  and 
cσ
 
are unitary transformations on quantum system νµψ Ψ⊗Ψ⊗
 
applied by Alice, Bob and 
Charlie respectively. To allow all three parties giving their inputs, we rewrite steps 1-3 and then 
proceed as follows: 
1. Charlie performs BSM on νΨ′  and stores his BSM result 21cccc =′ . 
2. Alice applies Pauli transformation },{ 2121 1 axazaxaza σσσσσ ⊕∈  on ψ , teleports the state ψσ a  
to Bob over EPR channel µΨ′  and announces her BSM result }11,10,01,00{∈′aa .  
3. Bob measures his half ψσσψ τ a=′ , applies Pauli transformation },{ 2121 1 bxbzbxbzb σσσσσ ⊕∈
 
on 
ψ ′
 
and sends ψσσσψ τ ab=′′ to Charlie. 
4. Charlie applies teleportation encoding },{ 2121 1 cxczcxczc σσσσσ ⊕∈
 
on ψ ′′  and announces the 
outcome of two-sided computation  
                                                
ψσσσσψσσσ τ abccbaf =);,,(                                              (3) 
Verification: All the parties announce their signatures 2a , 2b
 
and 2c respectively. Now each of 
these parties can verify the outcome individually. Remember, announcements of signature does 
not reveal the input message; for each signature bit, there are two arbitrary message bits 
corresponding to Pauli operator sxmzms σσσ = .  
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